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Abstract
This paper develops a DSGE model of sovereign default and contagion for small
open economies that have common risk averse international investors. The financial
links generated by these investors explain the endogenous determination of credit
limits, capital flows, and the risk premium in sovereign bond prices. In equilibrium,
these variables are a function of both an economy’s own fundamentals and the fun-
damentals of other economies. The model is able to replicate both the Wealth and
Portfolio Recomposition channels of contagion. Quantitatively, the model is consis-
tent with the contagion of the Argentinean crisis to Uruguay and the Russian crisis
to Brazil.
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1 Introduction
In the last decades, the world has witnessed several financial crises that have oc-
curred simultaneously across countries. Examples include the Debt Crisis of 1982,
the Mexican Crisis of 1994, the Asian Crises in 1997, the Russian Crisis of 1998, and
more recently the Euro-debt Crisis in 2011. While the simultaneity of crises could
be explained by the occurrence of a common shock to several economies, contagion is
another plausible explanation, and the one this paper will focus on. Contagion corre-
sponds to the transmission of a negative income or financial shock from one economy
to other economies. The empirical literature that looks at the simultaneity of crisis
is quite large, and evidence of contagion in sovereign bond markets is considerable.1
The current paper is concerned with advancing an endogenous theory of contagion
of financial crises based on financial links between economies. Countries are linked
financially when they have common investors. The emphasis on financial links is
strongly supported in the empirical literature.2
The model in this paper studies financial market links across countries in a dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium setting where the stochastic processes of the
emerging economies’ bond prices are endogenously determined. The model extends
the literature in endogenous sovereign risk in order to consider sovereign bond mar-
kets in a multi-country framework.3 This type of model allows for an endogenous
determination of the price of one period non-contingent discount bonds as a function
of the economy’s default risk. Through the consideration of financial links across
economies, the default risk of any economy becomes a function not only of the do-
mestic fundamentals but also a function of the fundamentals of countries which share
investors with the domestic country. The model is used to show quantitatively that
contagion can explain co-movements in the price of emerging economy bonds, cap-
1See for example Valdes(1996), Baig and Goldfajn(1998), Edwards(2000), and Baig and Gold-
fajn(2000).
2See for example Kaminsky and Reinhart(1998), Van Rijckeghem and Weder(1999), Kaminsky
and Reinhart(2000), Hernandez and Valdes(2001), Kaminsky et al.(2004), Broner et al.(2006), and
Hau and Rey(2008).
3Some of the relevant papers considering a single country include Aguiar and Gopinath(2006),
Arellano(2008), Cuadra and Sapriza(2008), Hatchondo, Martinez and Sapriza(2008), Mendoza and
Yue(2008), Martinez and Hatchondo(2009), and Lizarazo(2012).
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ital flows, output and consumption beyond the level explained by a country’s own
fundamentals.
Within the present model, the framework is one of a set of small open economies
with stochastic endowments. These small open economies have access to an inter-
national credit market populated by international investors. International investors
are assumed to be risk averse, with preferences that exhibit decreasing absolute risk
aversion in wealth (DARA). There is a problem of enforcement in the sense that inter-
national investors cannot force the small open economies to repay their debts. If any
economy defaults, it is temporarily excluded from the world credit market. This con-
text forces international investors to consider the risk of default when choosing their
portfolio. Any type of reallocation of the international investors portfolio has effects
over several countries at the same time. Therefore, the risk of default is endogenously
determined by the economy’s own fundamentals, and by the fundamentals of other
economies: income shocks to an emerging economy generate changes in the risk of
default in that economy, and, through financial links, these changes in turn impact
other emerging economies. Financial links generate contagion through two channels,
the Wealth channel and the Portfolio Recomposition channel.
(i) The Wealth Channel of Contagion: When an income shock in a country
forces that country into default, the shock generates losses for international
investors. If the preferences of the investors exhibit DARA, the negative wealth
effect of the shock reduces investors’ tolerance for risk. A reduction in tolerance
for risk makes investors shift away from risky investments (countries) toward
riskless investments (T-Bills). Countries that initially neither default nor face
an income shock would face a reduction in the amount of resources available to
borrow from, leading to contagion.
(ii) The Portfolio Recomposition Channel of Contagion: When the risk of de-
fault is correlated across countries, an increase in the risk of default in one coun-
try modifies the optimal portfolio of international investors. As investors adjust
their portfolios, some countries which did not face an income shock nonetheless
face a reduction in the amount of resources available to borrow from, leading to
contagion.Other countries, receiving capital inflows, experience flight to quality.
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The wealth channel of contagion is analyzed in Kyle and Xiong (2001), Lagunoff
and Schreft (2001), and Goldstein and Pauzner (2004). These papers show that if
investors’ preferences exhibit DARA, then as a consequence of the reduction on their
tolerance toward risk at lower levels of wealth, the optimal response of the investors
to financial losses is to reduce their risky investments. The portfolio recomposition
channel of contagion is studied in the theoretical papers of Choueri (1999), Schinasi
and Smith (1999), Kodres and Pritsker (2002), and Broner et al. (2006). Using a
partial equilibrium approach where the determination of asset returns is exogenous
to the model, these papers highlight the fact that contagion might be successfully
explained by standard portfolio theory: in order to reestablish the optimal degree of
risk exposure in their portfolio after a negative shock to the return of the assets of
some economy, it is optimal for investors to liquidate holdings of assets with expected
returns that exhibit some correlation with the expected return of the crisis country.
The results of the current paper are consistent with the empirical evidence regard-
ing contagion as a consequence of financial links. First, since investors’ preferences
exhibit DARA, they are able to tolerate more default risk when they are wealthier. As
a consequence, both capital flows to emerging economies and the equilibrium price of
sovereign bonds are increasing functions of investors’ wealth levels. Furthermore, the
high correlation between investors’ wealth and emerging economies’ financing condi-
tions can account for the simultaneity of crises because a default by any economy is
equivalent to a negative wealth shock to the investors. This shock is transmitted to
other countries via the wealth channel of contagion.
Second, because of the common investors, when the probability of default increases
for some foreign country, other countries’ financing conditions change. When the
probability of default for some foreign country increases, two opposing forces affect
the financing situation of other emerging economies: On the one hand, a decrease in
the price of the sovereign bonds of the foreign country constitutes an expected future
negative wealth shock to the investors due to the higher associated probability that
this country will default. This effect increases the default risk of the other economies.
On the other hand, an increase in default probabilities induces a substitution away
from the assets of the economies whose risk responds more strongly towards the
assets of the economies whose risk did not increase too much. This effect would tend
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to increase capital flows to some emerging economies. For any country different from
the crisis country, if the first effect dominates contagion is observed: the correlation of
capital flows across emerging economies is positive. On the other hand, if the second
effect dominates, “flight to quality” is observed: emerging economies with robust
fundamentals receive capital flows when other countries are affected by financial crises.
In practice, whenever the economies fundamentals are sufficiently weak, the effect of
the expected negative wealth shock will dominate the substitution effect.
Third, the likelihood of default in equilibrium for any emerging economy is a
function also of other emerging economies’ fundamentals. In the numerical simula-
tions in the present paper, for economies with relatively high default probabilities,
default is more likely to be an equilibrium outcome when the fundamentals of other
economies deteriorate and sovereign spreads are positively correlated; for economies
with relatively low probabilities of default, default is less likely to be an equilibrium
outcome when the fundamentals of other economies deteriorate and sovereign spreads
are negatively correlated.
The quantitative part of the paper studies the case of the contagion of the Argen-
tinean crisis to Uruguay, the case of the contagion of the Russian crisis to Brazil, and
finally looks at a counter-factual case that exhibits the occurrence of flight to quality
for economies with relatively sound fundamentals.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section II develops the model; section III focuses
on characterizing contagion, and presents a simpler version of the model in order
to discuss the portfolio recomposition channel of contagion; section IV presents the
numerical results of the paper; and section V concludes.
2 The Model
Definition 1 The state of the world in the model, S = (s,W ), is given by the re-
alization of the emerging economies’ fundamentals, s = s1 × s2 × . . . × sJ and the
representative investor’s asset position or wealth, W . In this model, sj = (bj, yj, dj),
where bj is economy j’s asset position, yj is economy j’s endowment, and dj is a
variable that describes if economy j is in default or repayment state.
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2.1 Sovereign Countries
There are J < ∞ identical small open economies each populated by risk averse
households that maximize their discounted expected lifetime from consumption
max
{cj,t}
∞
t=0
Eτ
∞∑
t=0
βtu (cj,t) (1)
where 0 < β < 1 is the discount factor and cj, t is emerging economy j’s consumption
at time t. The periodic utility of emerging economy j takes the functional form
u(cj) =
c1−γj
1−γ
where γ > 0 is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
In each period, the households of each economy j receive a stochastic stream
of consumption goods yj. This income is independently distributed across emerging
economies, and its realizations are assumed to have a compact support and to follow
a Markov process with a transition function f(y′j | yj). Households in each economy
j also receive a lump-sum transfer from their government.
The government of each economy j is a benevolent government that aims to
maximize the lifetime utility of the households in the economy. The governments
have access to international financial markets, where they can trade one-period non-
contingent bonds with international investors.4 The governments use their access to
financial markets to smooth the consumption path of the households in their economy.
In the international financial markets the governments borrow or save by buying
one period bonds b′j at price qj(b
′
j , S). Both the investors and each government j take
as given the price of economy j’s non-contingent discount bonds. In each period, the
proceeds of these bonds are rebated back to the households in economy j.
The bonds of any emerging economy j, b′j , are risky assets because debt con-
tracts between the government and the investors are not enforceable. At any time,
government j can choose to default on its debt. If the government defaults, all its
current debt is erased, and the government is temporarily excluded from international
financial markets. Defaulting also entails a direct output cost for country j.
4Throughout the paper it is assumed that the governments of the economies are not able to trade
financial assets between them.
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Because international investors are risk averse, the bond prices of the emerging
economies, qj(b
′
j , S) for j = 1, . . . , J , have two components: the price of the expected
losses from default qRNj (δj(b
′
j , S)) that corresponds to the price of riskless bonds,
qf , (hereafter T-Bills) adjusted by the default probability δj(b
′
j , S), and an “excess”
premium or risk premium ζRAj (b
′
j , S).
For any emerging economy j, when b′j ≥ 0, the probability of default for the
economy, δj(b
′
j , S), is 0. Since the asset is riskless in this case, the risk premium,
ζRAj (b
′
j , S), is also 0. Therefore, the price of economy j’s bond is equal to the price of
T-Bills which is qf = 1
1+r
, where r is the constant international interest rate. Only
when b′j ≤ 0 can δj(b
′
j , S) and ζ
RA
j (b
′
j , S) be different from 0.
For any economy j, when its government chooses to repay its debts, the resource
constraint of the emerging economy is given by
cj = yj − qj(b
′
j , S)b
′
j + bj . (2)
For the same economy, when the government chooses to default the resource con-
straint is given by
cj = y
def
j (3)
where ydefj = h(yj) and h(yj) is an increasing function.
Define V 0j (S) as the value function of the government of economy j that has the
option to default. The government starts the current period with assets bj and income
yj; the other economies that share investors with country j start the current period
with assets bk and income yk for k = 1, . . . , J and k 6= j; all these countries face
a representative international investor that has wealth W . The government of any
economy j decides whether to default or repay its debts to maximize the households’
welfare. Each government takes as given the repayment/default decisions of the other
governments.5 Given the option of default for country j, V 0j (S) satisfies
V 0j (S) = max
{R,D}
{
V Rj (S), V
D
j (S)
}
(4)
5Through the paper it is assumed that the governments of the economies make their repay-
ment/default decision at the same time.
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where V Rj (S) is the value to government j of repaying its debt and V
D
j (S) is the value
of defaulting in the current period.
If government j defaults, then the value of default is given by
V Dj (S) = u(y
def
j ) +
β
∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′J
[θV 0j (0, y
′
j, {s
′
k}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W
′) + (1− θ)V Dj (0, y
′
j, {s
′
k}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W
′)]
J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h.
where θ is the probability that a defaulting economy regains access to credit markets.
If government j repays its debts, then the value of not defaulting is given by
V Rj (S) = max
{b′j}
{
u(yj − qj(b
′
j , S)b
′
j + bj) + β
∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′J
V 0j (S
′)
J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h
}
.
For the government of emerging country j, the repayment/default decision de-
pends on the comparison between the value of repaying its debt, V Rj (S), versus the
value of opting for financial autarky, V Dj (S). The repayment/default decision is sum-
marized by the indicator variable dj which takes on a value of 1 when the government
repays its debt and 0 when the government does not repay its debt.
For each economy j, and conditional on the representative investor’s wealth level
W and the other economies fundamentals {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j, emerging economy j’s default
policy can be characterized by its repayment and default sets:
Definition 2 For a given level of wealth, W , and the fundamentals of other
emerging economies in the investor’s portfolio, {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j, the default set
Dj
(
bj | {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W
)
consists of the equilibrium set of yj for which default is op-
timal when the government’s asset holdings are bj:
Dj(bj | {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W ) =
{
yj ∈ Y j : V
R
j (S) ≤ V
D
j (yj, {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W )
}
.
The repayment set Aj(bj | {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W ) is the complement of the default set. It
corresponds to the equilibrium set of yj for which repayment is optimal when the
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government’s asset holdings are bj:
Aj(bj | {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W ) =
{
yj ∈ Y j : V
R
j (S) > V
D
j (yj, {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W )
}
.
Equilibrium default sets, Dj(b
′
j | {s
′
k(S)}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W
′(S)), are related to equilib-
rium default probabilities, δj(S
′ | S), by the equation
δj(b
′
j , S
′ | S) = 1− Edj
′(b′, S ′ | S) =
∫
Dj(b
′
j |{s
′
k(S)}
J
k=1,k 6=j
,W ′(S))
f(y′j | yj)dy
′
j ×
J∏
k=1,k 6=j
∫
y′
k
f(y′k | yk)dy
′
k. (5)
In this model, conditional on other economies’ fundamentals {s′k}
J
k=1,k 6=j, and on
the investors’ wealth W , the well known results of comparative statics follow for
the model of endogenous sovereign risk with risk neutral international investors (see
for example Aguiar and Gopinath (2006) Arellano(2008)): First, default sets are
shrinking in the economies’ assets (i.e. if bj,1 < bj,2 then Dj
(
bj,2 | {s
′
k}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W
)
⊆
Dj
(
bj,1 | {s
′
k}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W
)
), and therefore the probability of default δj(b
′
j , S) is de-
creasing in b′j . Second, the governments of the emerging economies only default when
the economies are facing capital outflows, i.e. when bj−qj
(
b′j(S), S
)
b′j (S) < 0. Third,
conditional on the persistence of the income process not being too high, the default
risk of any economy j is larger for lower levels of income. Since the economic intu-
ition of these results is identical to the intuition in the model of endogenous sovereign
default risk with risk neutral investors, it will not be discussed in detail here.
On the other hand, as in models of endogenous sovereign risk and risk averse
investors (see for example Lizarazo (2012)), the risk premium ζRAj (b
′
j , S) is also de-
creasing in b′j . Therefore bond prices qj(b
′
j , S) are increasing in b
′
j .
2.2 International Investors
There are a large but finite number of identical competitive investors who will be
represented by a representative investor. The representative investor is a risk averse
agent whose preferences exhibit DARA. The investor has perfect information regard-
ing the income processes of the emerging economies, and in each period the investor
is able to observe the realizations of these incomes.
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The representative investor maximizes her discounted expected lifetime utility
from consumption
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtLv
(
cLt
)
(6)
where cL is the investor’s consumption and v(cL), her periodic utility, is given by
v(cL) =
(cL)
1−γL
1−γL
, with γL > 0. The representative investor is endowed with some
initial wealth, W0, at time 0; in each period she receives an exogenous income X .
Because the representative investor is able to commit to honor her debt, she can
borrow or lend from industrialized countries (which are not explicitly modeled here)
by buying T-Bills at the deterministic risk free world price of qf . The represen-
tative investor can also invest in non-contingent bonds of the emerging economies
j = 1, . . . , J which have an endogenously determined stochastic price of qj. As was
mentioned in the sub-section on the emerging economies, this price is taken as given
by both the investor and the governments of the emerging economies.
On the side of the investor, the timing of the decisions within each period is as
follows: After the shocks to the economies’ income are realized and the governments
of these economies make their repayment/default decisions, the investor realizes her
gains/losses and observes her actual wealth for the period, W . W is given by W =
ϑTB +
∑J
j=1 ϑjdj . After observing W , the investor chooses her next period portfolio
allocation, investing in the economies whose governments have payed the debt from
the previous period, ϑ′j , and in T-Bills, ϑ
TB′ . Finally, the representative international
investor’s consumption, cL, takes place.
In each period the representative investor faces the budget constraint
cL = X +W − qfϑTB′ −
J∑
j=1
qjϑ
′
jdj. (7)
To simplify the investor’s optimization problem, it is assumed that the investor
cannot go short in her investments with emerging economies. Therefore, whenever the
governments of the emerging economies are saving, the representative international
investor receives these savings and invests them completely in ϑTB
′
. Therefore, for
any economy j, ϑ′j = −b
′
j if the economy is borrowing, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
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The law of motion of the representative investor’s wealth is given by
W ′ =
J∑
j=1
ϑ′jd
′
j + ϑ
TB′. (8)
For the representative investor that faces J governments, each with the possibility
of defaulting and each with assets bj and income yj at the start of the period, define
the value function, V 0L (S), as follows:
V
0
L (S) = max
{ϑ′j}
J
j=1
, ϑTB′
{
v(X +W − qfϑTB′ −
J∑
j=1
qjϑ
′
jdj) + βL
∫
y′
1
. . .
∫
y′
J
V
0
L(S
′)
J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h
}
.
Further, the representative investor faces a lower bound on her asset holdings
W < 0 that prevents Ponzi schemes, W ′ ≥ W . W corresponds to the “natural”
debt limit discussed in Aiyagari (1994). Additionally, the investors asset position in
bonds of the emerging economy is non-negative, i.e. ϑj ≥ 0 for j = 1, . . . , J .
Because v(cL) satisfies the standard Inada conditions, and X is sufficiently large,
cL > 0 always. Because the representative investor is not credit constrained, when
the government does not default in the current period the solution to the investor’s
optimization problem can be characterized by the following first order conditions:
For ϑTB′ : qfvcL
(
cL
)
= βL
∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′J
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)] J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h. (9a)
For ϑ′j : qjvcL
(
cL
)
= βL
∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′
J
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
dj
′
] J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h. (9b)
The set of J equations (9) determine the allocation of the representative investor’s re-
sources to each one of the J emerging countries. It is possible to manipulate equations
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(9) to get
qj = βL
∫
y′1
. . .
∫
y′
J
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
dj
′
]
vcL (cL)
J∏
h=1
f(yh, y
′
h)dy
′
h.
= βL
Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
, dj
′
]
vcL (cL)
+ qRNj .
= ζRAj + q
RN
j . (10)
where qRNj = q
f (1− δj). Equation (10) shows the two components of the bond prices
of economies that trade financially with risk averse investors. The first component,
qRNj , compensates investors for the expected loss from default. The second compo-
nent, ζRAj , corresponds to the risk premium that economy j’s bonds must carry in
order to induce risk averse investors to hold them. The main determinant of the
“excess” risk premium ζRAj is the covariance term in equation (10). This covariance
term is non-positive: Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′)
, dj
′
]
≤ 0. 6
Because cL is a function of W , γL, and the investor’s investments in other
economies, it is possible to see from equation (10), that qj for j = 1, · · · , J are also a
function of those variables. Therefore, in this model, conditional on other economies’
fundamentals {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j, and on the investors’ realized wealth W , the comparative
statics results of Lizarazo(2012) follow:
Proposition 1 For any state of the world, S, as the risk aversion of the international
investor increases, the governments’ incentives to default increase.
Proof. See Appendix.
6For b′j with δj = 0 or δj = 1, Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
, dj
′
]
= 0, and qj = q
f or qj = 0 respectively. If
0 < δj < 1, then for the states of the word next period in which government j repays
[
W ′ |dj ′=1
]
=
ϑj
′ +
∑J
k=1,k 6=j ϑk
′dk
′ + ϑTB′; and for the states in which the government j defaults
[
W ′ |dj ′=0
]
=∑J
k=1,k 6=j ϑk
′dk
′ + ϑTB′. Because
[
W ′ |dj ′=1
]
>
[
W ′ |dj ′=0
]
then
[
cL
′
|dj ′=1
]
>
[
cL
′
|dj ′=0
]
and
by concavity of v(·),
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
|dj ′=1
]
<
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
|dj ′=0
]
. As a consequence, for bj
′ with more
dj
′ = 1, vcL
(
cL
′
)
is lower. Clearly for this case Cov
[
vcL
(
cL
′
)
, dj
′
]
< 0.
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Proposition 2 Default sets are shrinking in the assets of the representative in-
vestor. For all W1 < W2, if default is optimal for bj in some states yj given W2,
then default will be optimal for bj for the same states yj given W1 and therefore
Dj
(
bj | W2, {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j
)
⊆ Dj
(
bj |W1, {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j
)
Proof. See Appendix.
As discussed in Lizarazo (2012), γL is an important determinant of the emerging
economies’ access to credit markets and their risk of default. The more risk averse are
international investors, the higher is the default risk and the tighter are the endoge-
nous credit constraints faced by all emerging economies. The result of Proposition 2
is consistent with empirical findings which characterize the role of investor’s risk
aversion in the determination of country risk and sovereign yield.7
Also as in Lizarazo (2012), for the present model, the higher is W , the smaller
is the default risk of any economy in the investor’s portfolio, and hence the more
relaxed is the economy’s endogenous credit constraint. Several empirical papers are
consistent with the results in Proposition 2.8 The results in Proposition 2 are also
consistent with the evidence regarding financial contagion across countries who share
investors.9
Because both investors’ wealth and the fundamentals of other emerging economies
in the investors’ portfolio have an effect on the determination of qj , it is clear that
sovereign bond prices across economies that share investors are jointly determined
and therefore must be correlated. The discussion of this correlation will be postponed
until the section on the characterization of contagion channels.
7See, for example, Arora and Cerisola(2001), FitzGerald and Krolzig(2003), Ferruci et al.(2004),
Garcia-Herrero and Ortiz(2005), Gonzales and Levy(2006), and Longstaff et al.(2008). These papers
find that changes in the risk appetite of international investors have an important impact on the
determination of sovereign bond spreads of emerging economies.
8See, for example, FitzGerald and Krolzig(2003), Mody and Taylor(2003), Ferruci et al.(2004),
Gonzales and Levy(2006), and Longstaff et al.(2008). These papers establish that proxies of inter-
national investors’ wealth are important factors in the determination of sovereign bond spreads for
emerging economies.
9See, for example, Kaminsky and Reinhart(1998), Van Rijckeghem and Weder(1999), Kaminsky
and Reinhart(2000), Hernandez and Valdes(2001), Kaminsky et al.(2004), Broner et al.(2006), and
Hau and Rey(2008).
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2.3 Equilibrium
The recursive equilibrium for the model is defined as a set of policy functions for (i)
the emerging economies’ consumption {cj(S)}
J
j=1, (ii) the governments’ asset hold-
ings
{
b′j(S)
}J
j=1
, (iii) the governments’ default decisions {dj(S)}
J
j=1 and the associ-
ated default sets Dj(bj | {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W ), (iv) the representative investor’s consump-
tion cL(S), (v) the representative investor’s holdings of emerging economies’ bonds{
θ′j(S)
}J
j=1
, (vi) the representative investor’s holdings of T-Bills θTB
′
(S), and (vii)
the emerging economies’ bond price functions
{
qj(S, b
′
j)
}J
j=1
, such that:
(i) Taking as given the representative investor’s policies and the bond price func-
tions
{
qj(S, b
′
j)
}J
j=1
, the emerging economies’ consumption {cj(S)}
J
j=1 satis-
fies the economies’ resource constraints. Additionally, the policy functions{
b′j(S)
}J
j=1
, {dj(S)}
J
j=1 and default sets Dj(bj | {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j ,W ) satisfy the op-
timization problem of the governments of the emerging economies.
(ii) Taking as given the governments’ policies and the bond price functions{
qj(S, b
′
j)
}J
j=1
, the representative investor’s consumption cL(s) satisfies her bud-
get constraint. Also, the representative investor’s policy functions
{
ϑ′j(S)
}J
j=1
and ϑTB
′
(S) satisfy her optimization problem and the law of motion of the
investor’s wealth.
(iii) Bond prices reflect the governments’ probabilities of default and the risk premi-
ums demanded by the representative international investor. These prices clear
the market for all the emerging economies’ bonds:
bj
′(S) = −ϑj
′(S) if bj
′(S) < 0 (11a)
0 = −ϑj
′(S) if bj
′(s) ≥ 0. (11b)
3 Contagion
From equation (10) it is evident that in this model the bond prices of economy j
depend on the income realizations of other emerging economies and the associated
repayment/default decisions of those countries. Hence, considering a crisis in some
foreign emerging economy k as a shock that changes the expected repayment/default
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decisions of the government of country k, and therefore δk and qk, a crisis in the
emerging economy k has a wealth and a substitution effect over the optimal investor’s
portfolio allocation to other emerging economies.
3.1 Wealth Channel of Contagion
First, the crisis in country k has a negative current or expected wealth effect. Because
the investor’s preferences exhibit DARA, she would move away from risky emerging
economies’ assets towards safer assets; this effect corresponds to the wealth channel
of contagion.
Proposition 3 There is a wealth channel of contagion. Proposition 2 implies that
if economy k in the investor’s portfolio defaults, then for economy j, which is also in
the investor’s portfolio, incentives to default increase.
Proof. See appendix.
The intuition of Proposition 3 is straightforward: a default by some emerging
economy in the investors’ portfolio is equivalent to a negative wealth shock. Therefore,
from Proposition 2, the probability of default for other economies in the investors’
portfolio increases as a consequence of the default by economy k.
3.2 The Recomposition Channel of Contagion
Second, the crisis in country k generates substitution between different risky emerg-
ing economy assets in the investor’s portfolio. The substitution effect of the crisis
corresponds to the portfolio recomposition channel of contagion. This channel oper-
ates when δk increases in this period thereby reducing the expected wealth of the
investor for the following period. This reduction in wealth makes risky countries less
attractive to the investor and less risky countries more attractive. In this situation,
countries with weak fundamentals, which are reflected in high default probabilities,
experience contagion; countries with solid fundamentals, which are reflected in low
default probabilities, experience flight to quality.10
10Kaminsky, Lyons, and Schmukler(2004) identify flight to quality in the following cases: during
the first two quarters after the Mexican crisis when mutual fund flows to Malaysia, Colombia, Poland,
14
Previous literature on the subject of contagion in partial equilibrium models (see
Kodres and Pritsker (1998)) has identified that the extent of the impact of the shock
in one asset over another asset depends on the degree of correlation between the
returns of those two assets. In the context of the current model, this result implies
that the impact of a shock in economy k over a particular economy j depends on the
strength of the positive correlation between qk and qj .
Quantitatively, the current model exhibits the following property: If the positive
correlation between qk and qj is low, then the positive substitution effect of the crisis
in country k might dominate its negative wealth effect, and there is flight to quality.
This outcome is observed when the other economies in the investor’s portfolio have
relatively sound fundamentals. On the other hand, when the positive correlation be-
tween qk and qj is large, the negative expected wealth effect dominates, and contagion
is observed due to the portfolio recomposition by investors. This outcome is observed
if the other economies in the investor’s portfolio have relatively weak fundamentals.
Because the complexity of the model does not allows us to unambiguously charac-
terize the operation of the portfolio recomposition channel theoretically, in the follow-
ing sub-section a simpler version of the model illustrates the portfolio recomposition
channel of contagion.
3.3 Example: Contagion Channels - 3 Period Model
In this section we consider a model with only 3 periods and 3 countries (V,W,Z) that
share a risk averse investor whose preferences exhibit DARA. A number of simplifying
assumptions will be made in order to facilitate the solution of the model. These
assumptions will not be discussed in detail here, except to say that the assumptions
preserve the main character and results of the infinite-horizon model. The full set of
assumptions is discussed in an appendix.
Investor’s optimization problem At any point in time any country might default
on its debts with the investor’s fund. For any country which does not default, the
and the Czech Republic increased by more than 10%; during the first two quarters after the Thai
crisis, when mutual fund flows to Venezuela, the Slovak Republic, and Sri Lanka increased by more
than 5%; and during the two first quarters after the Russian crisis, when mutual fund flows to
Mexico and Singapore increased by more than 5%.
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fund receives a repayment of X . When an economy pays back its debt, the investor
receives a fixed earning of hX from her fund with h being a constant. Therefore, in
periods t = 2, 3, the investor receives earnings Gt = zthX , where zt is the number
of countries in period t that repay their loans. In addition to the portfolio earnings,
in each period of her life, the investor receives a fixed endowment of U . The budget
constraints of the investor are given by cL1 = U − S1q
f , c∗L2 = U + S1 + G2 (c
∗L
2 is
the consumption that at t = 1 the investor thinks she will have in period t = 211),
cL2 = U + S1 + G2 − S2q
f (cL2 is the actual investor’s consumption in the period 2),
and cL3 = U + S2 +G3. St is the saving of the lender in period t; Gt are the earnings
from the lending activities of the investor’s fund that the investor receives in t.
Taking qf and Gt as given, the investor chooses S1 and S2 to solve her max-
imization problems in periods t = 1 and t = 2: Max
S1
v
(
cL1
)
+ βE1v
(
c∗L2
)
, and
Max
S2
v
(
cL2
)
+ βE2v
(
cL3
)
.
Countries’ problem On the other side of the market, the emerging economies
i = V,W,Z have a production technology given by Y i = α {qiX} if the country can
borrow from the investor’s fund, and Y i = φ when the country is not able to borrow
from the investor’s fund. α corresponds to the productivity of the economy i. Every
period, after the country has borrowed from the investor’s fund and has produced its
good, the country sets apart the repayment to the investor’s fund X . However, with
an exogenous probability δit these resources are destroyed by social upheaval at the
beginning of period t+ 1. (t+ 1 is the period when the payment of the debt is due.)
In period t = 1, all countries have the same productivity α and default probability
δ1. If country i is borrowing from the investor’s fund, its consumption is given by
ci = Y i−X = (qiα−1)X , and if the country cannot borrow from the fund, its budget
constraint implies ci = Y i = φ.
Countries’ equilibrium bond prices Given the methodology for the pricing of
the bonds, for any country i, qi1 and q
i
2 are given by q
i
1vc(c
L
1 ) = βEvc(c
∗L
2 )d
i
2, and
qi2vc(c
L
2 ) = βEvc(c
L
3 )d
i
3, where vc(·) is the marginal utility of consumption of the
investor, and dit takes the value of 1 when economy i repays its debt and takes the
11In order to simplify the characterization of the equilibrium, for this example it is assumed that
at the beginning of her life the investor thinks she only will be living 2 periods instead of 3.
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value of 0 otherwise.
Parameters The model is solved using the following parametrization: v(cLt ) =
log(cLt ), β = 0.95, q
f = β, α = 2/β, φ = 0.075, for i = V,W,Z, and U = 100.
3.4 Solution
Given these parameters, in equilibrium qt is decreasing in δt and hX , and St is in-
creasing in those variables: larger δt implies a riskier sovereign bond, and a larger hX
implies more volatile portfolio earnings.
3.4.1 Wealth Channel of Contagion
Given S1, there are four different scenarios for the investor’s maximization in t = 2.
Case A: all countries paid their debt from period t = 1. Case B: two countries paid
their debt from period t = 1. Case C: only one country paid its debt from period
t = 1. Case D: no country paid its debt from period t = 1. Figure 1 shows q2 for
an economy that has not defaulted on its debts from the first period, conditional on
the repayment of the other economies in the portfolio of the investor, and assuming
δi1 = 0.1 for i = V,W,Z, and hX = 50.
Comparing case A to the other cases, it can be observed that when some country
in the investor’s portfolio defaults the countries that do not default get a lower price
for their bonds. Therefore there is contagion and all economies end up having a lower
ci2 than when no country defaults.
12
Lower portfolio earnings as a consequence of a default in period t = 2 correspond
to the situation in the infinite horizon model of an investor with lower W as conse-
quence of a default at period t. These results illustrate the Wealth Channel of
Contagion.
12For example, assuming δi2 = 0.1 for i = V,W,Z, if economy V pays back in t = 2 but some or
all other countries do not, then instead of having cV2 = 0.7462X as in Case A, economy V gets a c
V
2
that is 2.79% lower for Case B, and a cV2 that is 8.74% lower for Case C.
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Figure 1: Wealth Channel of Contagion.
3.4.2 Portfolio Recomposition Channel
This subsubsection focuses on how an increase in the probability of default by one
country effects the other countries. δi1 and hX are assumed to behave as in the
previous subsection. It is further assumed that δi2 = 0.10 for i = V,W but that for
country Z default probability is given by δ∗.
Again, there are several different scenarios for the lender’s maximization in the
second period. Case A: all countries paid their debt from period t = 1. Case B1:
countries V andW paid their debt from period t = 1. Case B2: country Z and either
country V or country W paid their debt from period t = 1. Case C1: only either
country V or country W paid its debt from period t = 1. Case C2: only country Z
paid its debt from period t = 1. Case D: no country paid its debt from period t = 1.
For sake of brevity we focus on Case A, but the results apply also to Cases B1 and
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Figure 2: Portfolio Recomposition Channel.
B2, the other cases where is possible to observe portfolio recomposition.
Figure 2 illustrates that to have contagion it is sufficient to have the probability
of default of a country increasing without the need for an actual default. This figure
shows that in Case A, starting from a point in which δ∗ = 0.10, if δ∗ increases, qV2
and qW2 fall.
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In the current example, a negative shock to δ∗ triggers a recomposition of the
investor’s portfolio. This situation is observed in the infinite horizon model when
one of the countries in the investor’s portfolio faces a negative income shock that
13For example, if δ∗ increases to 0.2, countries V and W consume 0.28% less than if δ∗ had
remained constant. The contraction in cV2 in response to the increase in δ
∗ is even larger if the
investor is suffering losses from a default by country W : in Case B2 if δ∗ increases from 0.1 to 0.2,
cV2 falls by 0.63%. This contraction in c
V
2 is almost 3 times larger than the contraction in c
V
2 that
occurs in Case A.
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increases its default probability. As in this example, in the infinite horizon model the
shock to the other country in the investor’s portfolio results in a reallocation of the
investor’s portfolio away from risky investments causing contagion of the crisis to the
other countries in the investor’s portfolio. The results of this subsection illustrate the
Portfolio Recomposition Channel of Contagion.
Proposition 4 There is a recomposition channel of contagion. Whenever the proba-
bility of default of some country k increases, there is a recomposition of the investor’s
portfolio away from other risky countries.
3.4.3 Flight to quality
This subsection focuses on how the increase in δ∗ effects the other economies in the
investor’s portfolio, taking into account that the default probability of the economies
is endogenous to the financing conditions they face in international credit markets.
In this exercise, in period t = 2 a country with a medium probability of default,
(δ∗), receives an exogenous shock that increases its default probability. Assuming
that δi2 increases when c
i falls, for i = V,W,Z, then a country with a relatively low
risk (i.e., low δ2) might experience capital inflows after the initial shock to δ
∗. In the
literature of financial flows this phenomena is identified as flight to quality. In this
example it is assumed that after the initial exogenous shock to δ∗, the investment
fund estimates the changes in δi2 of the other countries in the portfolio taking into
account the comparative expected return of each of these countries for the fund after
the initial shock to δ∗.14
We focus on Case A and continue to assume δi1 = 0.1 and hx = 50. Additionally, it
is assumed that δV2 = δ
Low
2 = 0.02 initially, and δ
W
2 = δ
High = 0.2.15 For the revisions
of δV2 and δ
W
2 , the following functional form is assumed: δ
i,g
2 = δ
i,g−1
2
(
ci,g−22 −φ
ci,g−12 −φ
)
, where
i = V,W and g corresponds to number of the round of the revision of δit for the
economies in the investor’s portfolio, and cit = φ if an economy defaults.
16
14The fund does this calculation taking as given the investor’s savings decisions S2.
15The results presented here have the fund making N rounds of sequential revisions to δV2 and δ
W
2
(until the change in these probabilities is negligible). For simplicity, no revision to δ∗ is done after
the initial shock.
16The assumed relation between δ and c here is clearly consistent with the relation between these
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Figure 3: Flight to Quality.
Figure 3 shows qV2 and q
W
2 , and δ
V
2 and δ
W
2 as functions of δ
∗. From this figure, it
can be seen that when δi2 is endogenous, for i = V,W , and if δ
∗ is sufficiently large,
and δV2 is sufficiently low, then economy V will experience flight to quality. Figure 3
also shows that if δi2 is constant, for i = V,W , then when δ
∗ increases, both countries
suffer contagion after the shock to country Z.17
Because in this case capital flows to country V might increase as a consequence
of the increase of the riskiness of economy Z (i.e., the increase in δ∗), this exercise
illustrates the existence of flight to quality.
two variables in the infinite horizon model.
17For example, if δ∗ increases from 0.1 to 0.25, then qV2 increases by 0.0074% instead of falling by
0.0292%, and cV2 increases by 2.6196% instead of falling by 0.0634%; on the other hand, q
W
2 falls
by 3.9279% instead of falling by 0.2068%, and cW2 falls by 9.3045% instead of falling by 0.6135%.
Finally, δV2 falls from 2%, to 1.99997%, while δ
W
2 increases from 20% to 23.166%.
21
Proposition 5 For economies with relatively strong fundamentals, the effect of the
crisis in some foreign economy k might be “flight to quality”.
3.4.4 Portfolio Recomposition: Contagion or Flight to quality
Figure 3 shows that the phenomena of flight to quality would occur as long as the
initial change in δ∗ were sufficiently large. This result is consistent with the previously
mentioned results in Kodres and Pritsker (1998) that the extent of the impact of the
shock in one asset over another asset depends on the degree of correlation between
the assets’ returns. In the context of the current example, if the shock to δ∗ is not
sufficiently large, the implied correlation between qV2 and q
Z
2 is positive enough so that
V faces negative contagion as a result of the portfolio recomposition by the investor’s
fund. On the other hand, if the shock to δ∗ is sufficiently large, the correlation between
qV2 and q
Z
2 is negative enough to have country V experiencing capital inflows.
In the current example, to determine if flight to quality occurs, it is also important
to consider the magnitude of the response of δi2 to changes in c
i
2. If δ
i
2 responds too
little or too much to changes in ci2, no flight to quality will be observed. Both too
little and too much responsiveness of δi to changes in ci fails to generate the negative
correlation between qV2 and q
Z
2 . In the extreme, a very large response of δ
W to changes
in cW will have the overall riskiness of the fund’s portfolio increasing ‘too fast’ in
response to changes in δ∗. In this case, all countries will face negative contagion.
Therefore an additional conclusion can be drawn from the results of this example:
Taking as given δW2 and δ
Z
2 , there are some threshold values for δ
V that might deter-
mine if country V suffers contagion or benefits from flight to quality. Specifically, in
the example here, if δV2 = 0.02, δ
Z
2 = 0.25 and δ
W
2 = 0.20 initially, and if δ
W
2 = 0.20
subsequently increases to 0.25, country V receives capital inflows after the shock to
δW2 if δ
V
2 ≤ 0.01984; otherwise country V experiences capital outflows.
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This result illustrates the importance of a country’s own fundamentals in deter-
mining if it is affected positively or negatively by a portfolio recomposition.
18Note that in the infinite horizon model, besides the financial links between the economies, the
income shocks to the economies might modify δt in such a way as to strengthen the fundamentals
of a country enough to experience flight to quality.
22
Corollary 3 Given the riskiness of the other countries in the investor’s portfolio,
there is a critical value for the riskiness of the domestic economy that determines if
the economy experiences flight to quality or negative contagion.
3.4.5 From the Simpler Model to the Infinite Horizon Model
The model in the simple example presented here shares the most important elements
of the infinite horizon model. Therefore, the richer set up of the infinite horizon model
has the necessary elements to support the existence of the wealth and recomposition
portfolio channels of contagion and might, under appropriate parameterizations, ex-
hibit flight to quality. The quantitative results of the infinite horizon model confirm
the results of the simpler example.
4 Quantitative Analysis
The simulation of the model in this paper looks at three different cases of transmission
of crises through financial links. First, it analyzes the Argentinean default of 2001
and its contagion to Uruguay. Second, it looks at the Russian default of 1998 and its
contagion to Brazil. Finally it illustrates the case of ‘flight to quality’ for the case of
a fictional economy.
By considering the fundamentals of countries that share investors, the simulations
presented here aim to replicate the following observed dynamics of sovereign yield
spreads and capital flows to emerging economies: i) capital flows and domestic interest
rates across emerging economies are positively correlated, and ii) default is more likely
to be observed when the fundamentals of other emerging economies deteriorate.
4.1 Contagion of the Argentinean Default of 2001
During 2001 Argentina faced one of the worst economic crises of its history. The crisis
forced the country to default on US$100 billion external government debt (which cor-
responded to nearly 37% of GDP) by the end of 2001, and had strong real effects that
extended into 2002: according to estimates from the IMF, during 2001 Argentina’s
GDP fell by 4.4% and during 2002 it fell by an additional 10.9%.
For its part, Uruguay had been facing economic problems since 1998. These prob-
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lems were aggravated in 2001 by the outburst of cow foot-and-mouth disease which
negatively affected Uruguayan exports. Finally, the Argentinean crisis prompted
caution in consumers and investors leading to a fall in the real demand for and a
simultaneous exchange rate depreciation of the Uruguayan peso. As a result, there
was a significant increase in the public debt to GDP ratio in Uruguay, reaching a level
of 52%. According to the estimates of the IMF, during 2001 Uruguay’s GDP fell by
3.5%, and during 2002 Uruguay’s GDP fell by and additional 7.1%.
The fall in GDP in 2002 was due mainly to problems in Uruguay’s financial sector
which had strong financial links to Argentina: in early 2002, following the Argentina’s
default, Uruguay’s financial sector experienced large dollar deposit outflows (these
outflows exceeded US$100 million per day in the month of July 2002), as it faced a
rapid decline in its international reserves (Uruguay’s international reserves fell from
3 billion dollars at the end of 2001 to 650 million by August 2002). During 2002,
Uruguay’s debt was downgraded by investment rating agencies signaling the credit
risk involved in Uruguay’s external debt.
4.1.1 Simulation
Given the assumption of the model of identical economies that only differ in the real-
izations of their endowments, and in order to facilitate comparison with the previous
literature on the subject, the parameters considered for the simulation are chosen to
replicate the features of the Argentinean economy, and are taken from the calibra-
tion for this economy in Arellano (2008). The parameters related to international
investors are taken from Lizarazo (2012) which presents a quantitative model with
endogenous sovereign risk and risk averse international investors whose preferences
exhibit DARA for the analysis of the Argentinean default.
Table 1 shows the parameters of the numerical analysis of the model. The coeffi-
cient of risk aversion of the economy is 2, a standard value considered in the business
cycle literature. The free interest rate is set to 1.7%, to match the quarterly US
interest rate of a bond with a maturity of 5 years during the period under study.
GDP is assumed to follow a log-normal AR(1) process log(yt) = ρlog(yt−1) + ε
y with
E[εy] = 0 and E[εy2] = σ2y . The values estimated for the Argentinean economy are
ρ = 0.945 and σy = 0.025. Following a default there is an asymmetrical function for
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Table 1: Contagion: Parameter Values
Parameter Value
Std. Dev. Emerging Economy’s Income std [y] 0.025
Autocorr. Emerging Economy’s Income Process 0.945
Emerging Economy’s Discount Factor β 0.953
Emerging Economy’s Risk Aversion γ 2
Probability of re-entry τ 0.282
Critical level of output for asymmetrical output cost yˆ = 0.969E(y)
Representative investor’s Income X 0.01
Representative Investor’s Discount Factor βL 0.98
Representative investor’s Risk Aversion γL 2
Risk Free Interest Rate rf = 1
qf
0.017
the output loss as follows:
φ(y) =
{
ŷ if y > ŷ
y if y ≤ ŷ
}
(12)
with ŷ = 0.969E(y) which in Arellano (2008) targets a value of 5.53% for the aver-
age debt service to GDP ratio. The probability of re-entry to credit markets after
defaulting is set at 0.282, which is consistent with the empirical evidence regarding
the exclusion from credit markets of defaulting countries (see Gelos et al. (2011));
in Arellano (2008) this value targets a volatility of 1.75 for the trade balance. The
discount factor is set at 0.953 which in Arellano (2008) targets an annual default
probability of 3%.
The parameters for the international investors are as follows: the representative
investor’s discount factor is set to 0.98. As in Lizarazo (2012), if there were no
uncertainty, the discount factor of the investors would pin-down the international
risk free interest rate (i.e., β
L
qf
= 1); however, with uncertainty, in order to have a
well defined distribution for the investor’s assets, it is necessary that the discount
factor satisfies β
L
qf
< 1. The value of βL = 0.98 is the highest value in the range
commonly used in business cycle studies of industrialized countries such that for
an international interest rate of 1.7% the asset distribution of the investors is well
defined. The representative investor’s coefficient of risk aversion is set at 2, and the
criteria to choose this parameter is to generate a mean spread for model that is as
close as possible to the mean spread in Argentina for the period of study, which
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corresponds to 12.67%.19 The representative investor receives a deterministic income
of X = 1% of the emerging economy’s mean income in each period. As in Lizarazo
(2012), this parameter is included to preclude the investors from not investing in
the emerging economy in order to avoid a negative consumption level in the case of
default. Therefore, the strategy for choosing X is to give it as little importance as
possible by choosing a value that is close to 0 but that still allows for interior solutions
regarding the investors’ investments in the emerging economy’s bonds.20
The model is simulated for two economies that are labeled as (A) and (U) respec-
tively. For each economy the endowment shock is discretized into a 5 state Markov
chain and the asset position of the economy is approximated by a 75 point grid. The
investor’s wealth level is approximated using a 10 point grid, over which the solution
to the investor’s problem is linearly interpolated. The business cycles statistics of the
model are derived as follows: The model is simulated for 20, 000 periods. From these
20, 000 periods, sub-samples that have economy A staying in the credit market for 74
periods before going into a default are taken to compute the business cycles statistics
of the two economies. This process is repeated 5, 000 times, and the cycle statistics
are the average of the statistics derived from each of these repetitions.
4.1.2 Results
Table 2 describes the relevant business cycle statistics for Argentina and Uruguay for
the periods under study for (i) the entire period for which data is available and (ii)
for the year of the crisis. Additionally, in this table the results of the contagion model
are compared with the results of a simulation of the same model with risk neutral
investors. For comparison purposes, the risk neutral model has the same number of
endowment shocks and the same economies’ asset position as the contagion model.21
19Lizarazo(2012) also considers a value of 5 for γL which helps to attain a better match for the
level of the spreads and their volatility, however this larger value for γL has important costs in terms
of the computational time that it takes to solve the model. Therefore, given the larger dimension of
the contagion model relative to model in Lizarazo(2012), the value of 2 is chosen for γL.
20Overall, the numerical analysis of the model shows that as long as X is not too large (i.e.
X < 100% of the emerging economy’s average income) the results of the model are not very sensitive
to the value of X .
21The data for the business cycle statistics includes the period 1983:Q1-2001:Q4 for the all of the
Argentinean series except the consumption series which is only available for the period 1993:Q1-
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Table 2: Business Cycle Statistics: The Model and the Data - Argentina.
Statistics Data No-F.Links F.Links
1983Q1-2001Q4 2001Q1-2001Q4 74Q B.D. 4Q B.D. 74Q B.D. 4Q B.D.
mean (rA − rf ) % 12.67 22.26 4.50 4.90 5.70 12.40
mean (rU − rf ) % 8.53 9.53 4.50 4.90 5.70 12.40
std (rA − rf ) % 5.42 13.59 0.60 1.00 1.11 0.81
std (rU − rf ) % 1.33 1.45 0.60 1.00 1.11 0.81
corr (yA,rA − rf ) -0.60 -0.96 -0.13 -0.20 -0.06 -0.91
corr (yU ,rU − rf ) -0.30 -0.81 -0.13 -0.20 -0.06 -0.91
corr (yA,rU − rf ) -0.24 -0.70 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.80
corr (yU ,rA − rf ) -0.44 -0.80 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.80
corr (rA − rf ,rU − rf ) 0.18 0.52 0.00 0.00 0.32 0.88
std (tb/y)A % 1.83 2.11 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.78
corr (yA, (tb/y)A) -0.59 -0.85 -0.15 0.78 -0.16 0.60
std (tb/y)U % 4.27 5.62 0.76 0.77 0.77 0.78
corr (yU , (tb/y)U ) -0.48 0.26 -0.15 0.78 -0.16 0.60
corr (W , cA) 0.35 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.84
corr (W , cU ) 0.35 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.31 0.84
corr (W , rA − rf ) -0.10 -0.71 0.00 0.00 -0.34 -0.89
corr (W , rU − rf ) -0.10 -0.71 0.00 0.00 -0.34 -0.89
Default ProbA % 0.74 1.08 1.08
Default ProbB | DA % 1.08 2.02
mean (−(b/y)A) % 53.30 15.89 20.17 15.87 20.14
mean-Con (−(b/y)U ) % 15.89 20.17 11.86 12.20
Table 2 shows that in general terms the contagion model fits the business cycle
statistics of Argentina and Uruguay relatively better than the model without financial
links (i.e. risk neutral investors). In the data, the spreads of Argentina are 12.67%
for the whole period, and 22.26% during the crisis period, i.e. the year previous to
2001:Q4. For the Uruguayan series, the period for which the data are available corresponds to
1988:Q1-2001:Q4 for output, consumption, and trade balance, and to 1980:Q1-2001:Q4 for the in-
terest rate. Therefore, the business cycle statistics for each variable correspond to the initial moment
at which each of them is available until the fourth quarter of 2001. The correlations are taken for the
common periods in which any pair of variables are available. Output and consumption for Argentina
and Uruguay are seasonally adjusted and are in logs and filtered with the H-P filter. Argentina’s
and Uruguay’s trade balances are reported as a percentage of their respective output. The interest
spread is defined as the difference between the Argentinean and the Uruguayan interest rate and
the yield of a 3 month U.S. T-Bill. For the Argentinean output, consumption, and trade balance,
the source of the data is the IFS. For the interest rate of Argentina, the source is Neumeyer and
Perri(2005). For Uruguay, the series for output, consumption, and trade balance are constructed
using the Uruguayan Central Bank quarterly and annual data on indexes and volume for these vari-
ables. For Uruguay’s interest rate, the source is the Uruguayan Central Bank. This rate corresponds
to the domestic interest rate on loans, which is clearly not the interest rate on international loans,
but should be positively correlated. Unfortunately, there is no EMBI for Uruguay. (While it would
be possible to calculate an implicit interest rate from Uruguay’s debt service data, such data is
available only annually.)
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a default episode. The contagion model generates a spread for the overall period of
5.7% and a spread of 12.4% for the crisis period, while the model without financial
links only predicts a spread of 4.5% for the whole period and 4.9% for the crisis
period. Both models under-predict the volatility of the spreads and they do so by
nearly the same magnitude.
The better matching of the spreads by the contagion model is not the result of
a higher probability of default vis-a-vis the risk-neutral model, since both models
predict an annual probability of default of 4.4%. Also, the higher spreads of the
contagion model do not imply a contraction in the mean debt level since both models
have an unconditional mean debt level for the whole period of 15.9%, and in both
models the unconditional mean debt level for the crisis period increases to 20.1%.22
It is also interesting to note that conditional that there is going to be a default
episode by country A, the probability of default by country U is 0.94% larger per
year in the contagion model than in the model without financial links. This result of
the contagion model is consistent with the observed downgrading of the Uruguayan
external debt by international credit rating agencies that occurred in light of the
Argentinean crisis. Also, conditional that there is going to be a default episode by
country A, the mean debt level for country U is 11.9% for the whole period and 12.2%
for the year of the crisis.23 This result affirms that what is going on with country A
has important effects on country U’s access to credit markets.
With respect to the counter-cyclical behavior of spreads and trade balances, the
contagion model performs as well as the model without financial links and does better
in some cases for the crisis period. For example, in the data for the period of the
crisis, the correlation between Argentina’s spread and its GDP is −0.96. For this same
period, the correlation between the spread and the output predicted by the contagion
22The level of debt supported at equilibrium here is larger compared to the results in Arel-
lano(2008). This difference might be explained by the results of Hatchondo and Martinez(2006)
which show that the results of endogenous sovereign risk models are sensitive to the solution method
employed as well as the dimension of the grid used to expand the endowment shocks and the asset
position of emerging economies.
23The larger mean debt level that is observed during the periods of crisis reflects the debt dilution
effect of the crisis: with lower bond prices the economies are forced to incur higher levels of debt
during periods of economic distress.
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model is −0.91 while the model without financial links predicts this correlation to
be only −0.20. Regarding the correlation between Argentina’s trade balance and
Argentina’s GDP for the whole period, in the data this correlation is −0.59 while
both models predict the correlation to be negative and around −0.15. Unfortunately,
for the period of the crisis, the correlations predicted by both models do not exhibit
the counter-cyclical behavior observed in the data for Argentina. However, it is worth
mentioning that for this period the correlation in the data for Uruguay is positive
albeit smaller than the the one predicted by the model.
Regarding the correlations between the fundamentals of economies (A) and (U),
the contagion model is clearly superior to the model without financial links: when
the GDPs of the two countries are uncorrelated as assumed here, the model with-
out financial links predicts no correlation between the two economies’ fundamentals
(corr(yA,rU − rf), corr(yU ,rA− rf), and corr(rA− rf ,rU − rf) all equal to 0). On the
other hand, the contagion model predicts the correct sign for the fundamentals’ corre-
lation for both the entire period and for the crisis period. In terms of the correlation
between one country’s endowment and the other country’s spread, the correlation is
present for the whole period but largely underestimated, as the model predicts −0.03,
while the correlation in the data is −0.24. However for the period of crisis, the con-
tagion model does a much better job at explaining this correlation: in the data the
correlation is −0.70 while the model predicts it to be −0.80.
The contagion model also does very well with respect to the correlation between
the spreads of the two economies. For the whole period and during the crisis period,
the contagion model is consistent with the observed positive correlation of these two
variables. The contagion model is also consistent with the pattern observed in the
data of a significant increase in the correlation during the period of crisis. Both of
these correlations are over-predicted for the case of the domestic interest rates of
Argentina and Uruguay: in the data for the whole period, the correlation between
the spreads is 0.18 while the model predicts it to be 0.32; for the period of crisis, the
correlation is 0.52 in the data while the model predicts it to be 0.88.24
24While the correlation of the spreads is too high for the case studied here, Argentina and Uruguay,
it is in line with the observed correlation of Argentina with other developing countries for the
period 1994:Q3-2000:Q4. For example, the correlations predicted by the model are similar to the
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The model is also able to reproduce relatively well the correlations between Ar-
gentina and Uruguay’s fundamentals and the wealth of international investors as
proxied by the GDP of the US. For example, in the data, there is a correlation of
−0.10 and −0.71 between Argentina’s spread and the GDP of the US during the
whole period and the period of the crisis respectively, while the model predicts this
correlation to be −0.34 and −0.89. Also, the correlations between investors’ wealth
and Argentina’s consumption for the whole period and for the period of crisis are 0.35
and 0.21 respectively, while the contagion model predicts these correlations to be 0.31
and 0.84. The model with risk neutral investors cannot reproduce this behavior.
4.2 Contagion of the Russian Default of 1998
By mid-August of 1998 a severe crisis began in Russia. The crisis was brought on
by fiscal imbalances, the deterioration of the capital account, the fall in interna-
tional prices of Russian exports, and huge losses of international reserves. This crisis
spread around the world to Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Pakistan and South
Africa.25 For the remainder of this section, and in the numerical simulation, we will
focus on Brazil. For Brazil, the impact of the Russian default was extreme: there
was a substantial loss of reserves, leading to a devaluation of the Real against the
Dollar of 66% by the end of January 1999; and there was an increase in the external
debt-to-GDP ratio to 46%.26 Baig and Goldfajn (2000) document that during the
last quarter of 1999 there was a reduction in the international short term exposure
to Brazilian banks such that out of US$6.6 billion that was maturing, only US$4.0
billion was rolled over. According to these authors, the exposure in Brazil decreased
by around US$10 billion dollars from the first half of 1998 to the first half of 1999,
ones observed for the EMBI+ pairs of Argentina-Brazil, Argentina-Mexico, Argentina-Morocco,
Argentina-Nigeria, Argentina-South Africa, and Argentina-Venezuela. For 1994:Q3-2000:Q4, the
average correlation for these pairs is 0.87.
25As noted in Kaminsky, Lyons and Schmukler(2004), following the Russian crisis total capital
inflows for Latin America diminished 35%, and short term portfolio flows—bonds, equity and bank
lending—fell by 60%. Dornbush, Park and Claessens(2000) argue that the sharp reversal in capital
flows to emerging economies after this crisis triggered recessions in many developing countries,
and that in 1999 two fifths of the world economy experienced recession, with most GDP declines
concentrated in the developing world.
26During the year of the Russian default, capital flight from Brazil reached US$28 billion on top
of US$10 billion of lost capital the year before.
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Table 3: Contagion: Parameter Values - Russia
Parameter Value
Std. Dev. Emerging Economy’s Income std [y] 0.021
Autocorr. Emerging Economy’s Income Process 0.912
Deterministic. Growth Rate of the Income Process 0.012
Emerging Economy’s Risk Aversion γ 2.5
Critical level of output for asymmetrical output cost yˆ = 0.965E(y)
while at the same time exposure in Russia decreased by almost US$15 billion dollars.
4.2.1 Simulation
Given the assumption in the model of identical economies that differ only in the
realizations of their endowments, and since the default and contagion originated in
Russia, the parameters for the productivity process for the simulation are chosen to
replicate the Russian GDP process.27 The parameters for the economies’ risk aversion
and the punishment function are set to best match the joint business cycle statistics
of the Russian and Brazilian economies. The remaining parameters are the same as
in the previous quantitative exercise.28
Table 3 shows the parameters of the numerical analysis of the model. The coef-
ficient of risk aversion of the economy is 2.5, a value within the standard range of
the business cycle literature. As before, the GDP is assumed to follow a log-normal
AR(1) process log(yt) = ρlog(yt−1) + ε
y with E[εy] = 0 and E[εy2] = σ2y . The values
estimated for the Russian economy are ρ = 0.912 and σy = 0.021; additionally, an
estimated deterministic growth rate of 1.21% for Russian GDP is taken into account
in the the solution of the model. ŷ = 0.965E(y) targets a value of 11.76% for the
average default probability of the Russian Economy.29
27Unlike the case of Argentina and Uruguay, the productivity process for Brazil is quite different
from the productivity process for Russia, so this assumption of identical economies for the case of
Russia and Brazil is not an innocuous one. However, as in the case of Argentina and Uruguay,
the current exercise illustrates the role of financial links in international financial crises. Further
research with a more quantitative objective in mind could provide a more realistic analysis of the
Russian-Brazil contagion case by relaxing the assumption of identical economies.
28The model is simulated for two economies that are labeled as (R) and (B) respectively. The
state space is discretized as before. For the business cycles statistics of the model, the period for
the simulation is 35 quarters corresponding the period of time under study.
29Benjamin and Wright(2009) report that in the period 1989 − 2006 Russia defaulted 2 times,
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Table 4: Business Cycle Statistics: The Model and the Data - Russia.
Statistics Data No-F.Links F.Links
1995Q1-2003Q3 1998Q3-1999Q2 35Q 4Q A.D. 35Q 4Q A.D.
mean (rR − rf ) % 12.37 43.80 1.20 2.15 6.91 13.23
mean (rB − rf ) % 4.78 6.97 1.20 2.15 6.91 13.23
std (rR − rf ) % 16.25 12.65 0.20 0.27 5.86 6.90
std (rB − rf ) % 4.87 1.76 0.20 0.27 5.86 6.90
corr (yR,rR − rf ) -0.76 -0.84 -0.49 -0.28 -0.11 -0.45
corr (yB ,rB − rf ) -0.24 0.59 -0.49 -0.28 -0.11 -0.45
corr (yR,rB − rf ) -0.13 -0.99 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.42
corr (yB ,rR − rf ) -0.22 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.42
corr (rR − rf ,rB − rf ) 0.06 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.61
std (tb/y)R % 4.99 5.21 1.15 0.85 1.79 2.36
corr (yR, (tb/y)R) 0.03 0.36 0.16 -0.24 -0.12 0.25
std (tb/y)B % 0.99 0.64 1.15 0.85 1.79 2.36
corr (yB , (tb/y)B ) -0.02 -0.37 0.16 -0.24 -0.12 0.25
corr (W , cR) -0.38 -0.75 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.35
corr (W , cB) 0.03 -0.53 0.00 0.00 -0.04 0.35
corr (W , rR − rf ) 0.26 -0.87 0.00 0.00 -0.48 -0.68
corr (W , rB − rf ) -0.15 -0.53 0.00 0.00 -0.48 -0.68
Default ProbR % 2.94 0.15 3.62
Default ProbB | DR % 0.15 3.95
mean (−(1 + r)(b/y)R) % 2.23 3.72 3.55 13.65 18.37
mean-Con (−(1 + r)(b/y)B ) % 3.72 3.55 8.04 8.23
4.2.2 Results
Table 4 describes the relevant business cycle for Russia and Brazil for the periods
under study: 1995:Q1-2003:Q3—a period of high volatility in emerging sovereign bond
markets—and the year of the Russian crisis, 1998:Q3-1999:Q2. Also in this table, the
results of the model of contagion are compared with the results of a simulation of the
model with risk neutral investors.30 As before, this table shows that in general terms
the contagion model fits the business cycle statistics of Russia and Brazil relatively
better than the model without financial links (i.e. risk neutral investors).
In the data, the spreads of Russia are 12.37% for the whole period and 43.80%
implying an annual probability of default of 11.76%.
30The data for the business cycle statistics includes the period 1995:Q1-2003:Q3 for all the Russian
and Brazilian series except the Russian EMBI+ series which is only available from 1997:Q4 onwards.
As before, the correlations are taken for the common periods in which any pair of variables are
available. Output and consumption for Russia and Brazil are seasonally adjusted and are in logs
and filtered with the H-P filter. Russia and Brazil’s trade balances are reported as a percentage of
their respective output. The interest spread is defined as the difference between the Russian and
the Brazilian EMBI+ and the yield of a 3 month U.S. T-Bill. The source of all series except the
EMBI+ is the IFS. For the EMBI+ the source is JP Morgan.
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during the crisis period. (In this case the crisis period refers to the year of the default
episode).31 The contagion model generates a spread for the overall period of 6.9%
and 13.2% for the crisis period, while the model without financial links only predicts
a spread of 1.2% for the whole period and 2.2% for the crisis period. Regarding
the volatility of the spreads, both models under-predict this volatility, but the model
without financial links under-predicts this volatility by much more—quantitatively,
the contagion model predicts a volatility that is approximately 25 times larger than
the volatility predicted by the model without financial links.
For Russia and Brazil, unlike Argentina and Uruguay, the better matching of
the spreads by the contagion model is at least in part a result of the higher prob-
ability of default predicted by this model compared to the model without financial
links. (Compared to the model without financial links, the contagion model predicts
a probability of default for Russia much closer to the one reported in Benjamin and
Wright(2009).) However, as in the case of Argentina and Uruguay, the higher spreads
for the contagion model do not imply a contraction in the mean debt level supported
by the model in comparison to the mean debt level supported the model without
financial links. Also, as in the case of Argentina and Uruguay, for Russia and Brazil,
conditional that there is going to be a default episode by country R, the probability
of default for country B is larger—by 0.33% per year.
As before, both the contagion model and the model without financial links re-
produce the counter-cyclical behavior of the spreads, but the contagion model seems
to fit the data better for Russia’s trade balance.32 Also the contagion model is able
to explain the correlation between the investor’s wealth and the spreads, while the
model without financial links is silent about this correlation.
As in the case of Argentina and Uruguay, for Russia and Brazil the contagion
31The effects of the Russian crisis on other economies were not felt before the default, but after
it. For this reason, in the description of the data, the crisis period refers to the year of the default
episode and not the prior year as in the case of the Argentinean Crisis. However, for consistency,
the model itself treats the year prior to default as the crisis period.
32Russia’s trade balance behaves differently than Brazil’s trade balance. While Brazil’s trade
balance is counter-cyclical, Russia’s is pro-cyclical. Since the model here assumes an income process
that replicates Russia’s, the model should better match Russia, which is precisely what the contagion
model does in comparison to the model without financial links.
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Table 5: Contagion: Parameter Values - Fictional Economy
Parameter Value
Std. Dev. Emerging Economy’s Income std [y] 0.057
Autocorr. Emerging Economy’s Income Process 0.784
model explains relatively well the correlations between the fundamentals of economy
(R) and economy (B). For correlations between the GDP of the crisis country (R) and
the other country (B), the contagion model is not able to replicate the magnitude
of the correlation; however, the contagion model is consistent with an important
increase in the correlation during the crisis period in relation to the whole period: in
the data the correlation is −0.99 while the model predicts it to be −0.42. Regarding
the correlation between the spreads of the two countries, the contagion model does a
very good job: in the data, for the whole period the correlation between the spreads
of these rates is 0.06 and the model predicts it to be 0.04; for the period of crisis the
correlation is 0.83 in the data while the model predicts it to be 0.61.
4.3 Quantitative Example of Flight to Quality
The previous quantitative results seem to suggest that the contagion model will al-
ways tend to predict a positive correlation between the spreads of economies that
share common lenders. What follows is an example for a fictional economy that
differs from Argentina and Russia in that its endowment process exhibits a lower au-
tocorrelation and a larger variance for the shock, and has a zero growth rate. Previous
literature in endogenous sovereign default models has shown that small persistence in
the endowment process or a relatively large variance in the shock to the process can
be associated with relatively lower equilibrium default probabilities. In the context
of the model in this paper, smaller equilibrium default probabilities are equivalent to
more sound fundamentals. In what follows, we see that for this case the contagion
model can predict flight to quality.
4.3.1 Simulation
The parameters for this simulation will be identical to the ones in the Argentinean-
Uruguay exercise with the exception of the parameters for the productivity process
of the economy.
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Table 6: Business Cycle Statistics: The Model - Fictional Economy.
Statistics No-F.Links F.Links
74 B.DQ 4Q B.D. 74 B.DQ 4Q B.D.
mean (r(1) − rf ) % 2.70 4.63 3.24 5.35
mean (r(2) − rf ) % 2.70 4.63 3.24 5.35
std (r(1) − rf ) % 1.72 3.01 2.08 2.63
std (r(2) − rf ) % 1.72 3.01 2.08 2.63
corr (y(1) ,r(1) − rf ) -0.63 -0.60 -0.62 -0.61
corr (y(2) ,r(2) − rf ) -0.63 -0.60 -0.62 -0.61
corr (y(1) ,r(2) − rf ) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.25
corr (y(2) ,r(1) − rf ) 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.25
corr (r(1) − rf ,r(2) − rf ) 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.38
std (tb/y)(1) % 0.96 0.59 1.17 0.91
corr (y(1) , (tb/y)(1)) 0.32 -0.37 0.39 -0.25
std (tb/y)(2) % 0.96 0.59 1.17 0.91
corr (y(2) , (tb/y)(2)) 0.32 -0.37 0.39 -0.25
corr (W , c(1)) 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.05
corr (W , c(2)) 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.05
corr (W , r(1) − rf ) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05
corr (W , r(2) − rf ) 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.05
Default Prob(1) % 0.93 0.91
Default Prob(2) | D(1) % 0.93 0.87
mean (−(1 + r)(b/y)(1)) % 4.10 5.57 6.03 8.28
mean-Con (−(1 + r)(b/y)(2)) % 4.10 5.57 5.82 5.91
Table 5 shows the parameters for the productivity process of the economy; as be-
fore the GDP is assumed to follow a log-normal AR(1) process log(yt) = ρlog(yt−1)+ε
y
with E[εy] = 0 and E[εy2] = σ2y . The values for the fictional economy are ρ = 0.784
and σy = 0.057.
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4.3.2 Results
Table 6 describes the predictions for the business cycle statistics of the fictional econ-
omy. The table shows that the contagion model explains larger average spreads than
the model without financial links and that the spreads exhibit larger volatility. How-
ever, the simulation also shows that for economy under study the correlation between
the spreads of the bonds is negative instead of positive, showing that flight to quality
occurs in equilibrium.
This flight to quality is the last piece to the contagion puzzle. In general, the
33The model is simulated for two economies that are labeled as (1) and (2) respectively. The state
space is discretized as before, and the business cycles statistics of the model are derived as in the
analysis of the Argentinean default.
35
possibility of flight to quality shows the robustness and flexibility of the model to
apply to real-world situations. In the case of two “riskier” countries, as with Argentina
and Uruguay, or Russia and Brazil, crisis in one country leads to crisis in the other
country. However, as the last simulation shows, under the appropriate conditions,
crisis in one country could lead to more investment in other countries.
5 Conclusions
The empirical literature in international finance presents evidence that points to a
very relevant role for the fundamentals of other emerging countries in the determina-
tion of sovereign credit spreads and capital flows to emerging economies. The model
in this paper is the first model that endogenously determines sovereign bond prices
and at the same time endogenously accounts for contagion of crises.
The endogenization of bond prices and contagion occurs in two ways. First, the
consideration of enforcement problems in sovereign debt contracts allows default risk
and default incentives to be endogenized; therefore sovereign bond prices can be de-
termined endogenously by the model. Second, the assumption of DARA for investors
allows for endogenous financial links across economies that share investors. Together,
these two elements build a framework that explains the contagion of crisis. The intu-
ition for contagion is as follows: whenever a negative shock occurs in one country, this
shock increases the risk associated with that country; this increase in risk implies ex-
pected future negative wealth shocks for investors. Given DARA, investors’ tolerance
toward risk decreases following the wealth shock, leading to a portfolio recomposition.
Investors shift away from risky investments towards less risky ones.
Qualitatively the results of the model are consistent with the empirical evidence of
contagion from Argentina to Uruguay and Russia to Brazil: First, sovereign spreads
and capital flows to emerging economies are positively correlated across economies.
Second, the fundamentals of foreign emerging economies affect the determination of
domestic sovereign spreads and capital flows. Third, the average financing conditions
of an economy are less favorable after other countries have defaulted.
Quantitatively, implementation of the current model faces two primary hurdles,
first, the discontinuity of the default decisions, and second, the high dimension of the
state space of the model. The problem of the high dimensionality of the state might
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be overcome if the steepness of the pricing function could be reduced: currently, prices
respond too strongly to changes in the economy’s debt level. (Eventhough the price
function is made less steep by endogenizing financial links.) Therefore it is necessary
to have very fine grids for the asset position of the economies in order to capture a
great deal of the default action. This need, if satisfied, has an explosive effect on the
dimensionality of the state space of the model.
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Appendix A - Proofs
The following proofs assume permanent exclusion of credit markets after a default.
Under this assumption the value function of default is independent of γL, and W .
The quantitative analysis of the model generalizes the results to the case of temporary
exclusion. We focus in b′j < 0 (only in this situation is default possible), and the
equilibrium of the credit market implies θ′j = −b
′
j > 0. More borrowing implies a
more negative b′j .
Proposition 2 For any state of the world, S, as the risk aversion of the international
investor increases, the emerging economies’ incentives to default increase.
Proof. Considering the case in which the government has not defaulted and
assuming an interior solution for the allocation to the emerging economy j’s asset the
first order condition of the investor’s problem is
φ
(
ϑ′j
)
= E
{
−qjvc
(
cL
(
ϑ′j
))
+ βvc
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j
))
d′j
}
= 0.
Because the periodic utility of the international investor is of the CRRA type
and γL1 < γ
L
2 , then there exists a concave function ψ (·) such that v2
(
c; γL2
)
=
ψ
(
v1
(
c; γL2
))
. If ϑ′j,1 is the optimal allocation when γ
L = γL1 , and ϑ
′
j,2 is the op-
timal allocation when γL = γL2 then it holds that
φ1
(
ϑ′j,1
)
= E
{
−qjv1,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′j,1
))
+ βv1,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j,1
))
d′j
}
= 0.
φ2
(
ϑ′j,2
)
= E
{
−qjv2,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′j,2
))
+ βv2,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j,2
))
d′j
}
= 0.
Using v2
(
c; γL2
)
= ψ
(
v1
(
c; γL2
))
it is possible to define
φ2
(
ϑ′j,1
)
= Eψ′
[
v1
(
cL(ϑ
′
j,1
)
)
] {
−qv1,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′j,1
))
+ βΥ(ϑ′j,1)v1,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j,1
))
d′
}
< 0.
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where
Υ(ϑ′j) =
ψ′
[
v
(
c′L(ϑ
′
j
)
)
]
ψ′
[
v
(
cL(ϑ′j
)
)
] , Υ(ϑ′j) > 0 and Υ′(ϑ′j) < 0.34
The last inequality comes from the fact that both Υ(ϑ′j) and ψ
′
(
ϑ′j
)
are positive
and decreasing. The inclusion of these functions in the previous equation implies
that φ2
(
ϑ′j,1
)
is lower than φ2
(
ϑ′j,2
)
because Υ′(ϑ′j) and ψ
′
(
ϑ′j
)
give little weight to
the realizations of d ′j = 1, and high weight to the realizations of d
′
j = 0. Therefore
φ2
(
θ′j,2
)
> φ2
(
θ′j,1
)
.
The concavity of V L (·) implies that given qj and the risk of default δj , φ
(
θ′j
)
is
a decreasing function and as a consequence θ′j,2 < θ
′
j,1 which in equilibrium implies
b′j,2 > b
′
j,1.
Then for any state of the world S, taking as given qj and (δj), a higher γ
L would
result in the investor allocating a lower proportion of her portfolio to each of the
economies’ sovereign bonds. Therefore, when the investor is less risk averse there
are financial contracts that are available to each emerging economy which are not
available when the investor is more risk averse. Consequently given qj and δj then
V Cj,1
(
S; γL1
)
≥ V Cj,2
(
S; γL2
)
Because the utility of autarky for the emerging economy does not depend on γL,
it is clear that if for some S, default is optimal for economy j when γL = γL1 , then for
the same S default would be optimal when γL = γL2 . Additionally, because incentives
to default would be higher whenever γL = γL2 , than when γ
L = γL1 at equilibrium
δj
(
S, bj
′; γL2
)
> δj
(
S, bj
′; γL1
)
, and therefore qj
(
S, bj
′; γL2
)
< qj
(
S, bj
′; γL1
)
.
Proposition 3 Default sets are shrinking in the assets of the representative in-
vestor. For all W1 < W2, if default is optimal for bj in some states yj, given
W2 then default will be optimal for bj for the same states yj, given W1 therefore
34Taking as given the portfolio allocations of the investor to other emerging economies the deriva-
tive of Υ(ϑ′j) is given by
Υ′(ϑ′j) =
ψ′′[v(c′L(ϑ
′
j))]vc(c
′
L(ϑ
′
j))
∂c′L(ϑ
′
j)
∂ϑ′
j
− ψ′′[v(cL(ϑ
′
j))]vc(cL(ϑ
′
j))
∂cL(ϑ
′
j)
∂ϑ′
j
Υ(ϑ′j)
ψ′
[
v
(
cL(ϑ′j
)
)
] < 0.
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Dj
(
bj | W2, ψ, {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j
)
⊆ Dj
(
bj |W1, ψ, {sk}
J
k=1,k 6=j
)
Proof. Because the periodic utility of the international investor exhibit DARA
v
(
W1, ϑ
′
j
)
is a concave transformation of v
(
W2, ϑ
′
j
)
so if ϑ′j,1 is the optimal allocation
whenW = W1, and ϑ
′
j,2 is the optimal allocation whenW = W2, it is possible to define
v1
(
ϑ′j,1
)
= v
(
W1, ϑ
′
j,1
)
and v2
(
ϑ′j,2
)
= v
(
W2, ϑ
′
j,2
)
, where v1
(
ϑ′j
)
= ψ
(
v2
(
ϑ′j
))
. The
first order conditions of the investor are
φ1
(
ϑ′j,1
)
= E
{
−qjv1,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′j,1
))
+ βv1,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j,1
))
dj
′
}
= 0,
φ2
(
ϑ′j,2
)
= E
{
−qjv2,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′j,2
))
+ βv2,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j,2
))
dj
′
}
= 0,
and therefore
φ1
(
ϑ′j,2
)
= Eψ′
[
v2
(
ϑ′j,2
)] {
−qjv2,c
(
cL
(
ϑ′j,2
))
+ βΥ(ϑ′j,2)v2,c
(
c′L
(
ϑ′j,2
))
dj
′
}
< 0.
Υ(ϑ′) is defined as before, and as before the inequality comes from the fact that
Υ(ϑ′j) and ψ
′(ϑ′j) are both positive and decreasing. Therefore φ1
(
ϑ′j,2
)
< φ1
(
ϑ′j,1
)
.
Again the concavity of V L (·) implies that given qj and δj, φ
(
ϑ′j
)
is a decreasing
function, and as consequence ϑ′j,2 > ϑ
′
j,1 which in equilibrium implies b
′
j,2 < b
′
j,1.
Then for any S and taking as given qj and δj , a lower level of W would result in
this agent allocating a lower proportion of her portfolio to the emerging economies’
sovereign bonds. Therefore, when the investor is more wealthy there are financial
contracts that are available to the emerging economy that are not available when
the investor is less wealthy. Consequently, given qj and δj then V
C
j,1 (S−W ;W2) ≥
V Cj,2 (S−W ;W1).
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Because the utility of autarky for the emerging economy does not depend on W ,
it is clear that if for some bj in some states yj, default is optimal when W =W2, then
for the same states yj default would be optimal when W = W1. Because incentives
to default would be higher whenever W = W1, than when W = W2 at equilibrium
δj (S, bj
′;W ′1) > δ (S, bj
′;W ′2), and therefore q (s, bj
′;W ′1) < q (s, bj
′;W ′2).
35S−W corresponds to all the state variables of the world except for the wealth level of the investors.
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Proposition 6 There is a wealth channel of contagion. Proposition 2 implies that
if economy k which is in the investor’s portfolio defaults in her debts, incentives to
default for economy j which is also in the investor’s portfolio increase.
Proof. If economy k defaults in her debts with the investor, the wealth of this
agent will be (W | dk = 0) = θ
TB′ +
J∑
m=1,m6=k
θ′m, which is lower than the wealth for
economy k if she decides not to default, which is (W | dk = 1) = θ
TB′+
J∑
m=1,m6=k
θ′m+θ
′
k.
Therefore
V Cj
(
yj, bj , {ym}
J
m=1 , {bm}
J
m=1 , (W | dk=1)
)
> V Cj
(
yj, bj , {ym}
J
m=1 , {bm}
J
m=1 , (W | dk=0)
)
which implies that emerging economy j′s incentives to default are larger when some
economy k which shares investors defaults.
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Appendix B - 3 Period Contagion Model
Assumptions for 3 Period Contagion Model In this section we discuss a num-
ber of simplifying assumptions made to facilitate the analytical solution of the three
period model used in the paper. The model assumptions discussed here preserve the
main character and results of the infinite-horizon model.
(i) Initially, the default probability of the countries, δi, for i = V,W,Z is assumed
to be exogenous. Subsequently, to study the phenomena of flight to quality, it
will be assumed that δi is a decreasing function of the level of consumption of
the economies.36
(ii) The investor’s portfolio allocation to T-Bills (St) is decided independently of
the investor’s portfolio allocation to the emerging economies: The investor owns
an investing fund through which she invests in the countries. The fund has an
initial amount of resources that it can use only to invest in the economies; any
resources left in the fund at the end of the third period go to pay for the fund’s
operating expenses. On the other hand, taking into account only the earnings
from the investments made by the fund on her behalf, the investor decides her
borrowing or saving in riskless bonds, St, that she trades in international credit
markets at a risk free bond price of qf .37
(iii) The portfolio allocations of the investor’s fund to the emerging economies are
fixed, and identical across countries: Each period the countries borrow a fixed
amount −bi
′
= X , at a price qi that is endogenous: qi depends on the default
probability of the economy δi and on the endogenous risk premium that risk
averse investors demand in order to invest in risky assets ζ i.38
(iv) To simplify the model even further, it is assumed that at the beginning of the
initial period t = 1, the investor believes that she will only be alive during two
36In the infinite horizon model δi is endogenous and depends on the level of consumption of
economy i. The functional form for δi in the infinite horizon model is more complex than the one
assumed here for the simpler model.
37In the infinite horizon model the allocation between emerging economies’ bonds and T-Bills is
done jointly.
38In the infinite horizon model countries’ borrowing is endogenous.
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periods; only at the beginning of period t = 2 does the investor realize that she
is going to be around for an additional period.39
(v) The pricing of the bonds of the economies qi is done as in the infinite horizon
model using the utility function of the investor. In other words, it is assumed
that the profit function of the investor’s fund is identical to the investor’s utility
function.40
Model First Order Conditions In what follows the first order condtions for the
investor and the investing fund are presented:
(i) The first order conditions for the investor who chooses S1 and S2 are given by:
S1 : q
fuc(c
L
1 ) = βE1uc(c
∗L
2 ). (A-1)
S2 : q
fuc(c
L
2 ) = βE2uc(c
L
3 ). (A-2)
(ii) The first order conditions for the investor’s fund which determined the equilib-
rium bond prices of the economies qi1 and q
i
2 are given by:
qi1vc(c
L
1 ) = βEvc(c
∗L
2 )d
i
2. (A-3)
qi2vc(c
L
2 ) = βEvc(c
L
3 )d
i
3. (A-4)
where vc(·) is the marginal utility of consumption of the investor, and d
i
t is a
variable that takes the value of 1 when economy i repays its debt and takes the
value of 0 otherwise.
Note on the Solution of the Model
39In the infinite horizon model the investor is fully aware of the duration of her life. In the 3
period model this assumption is made in order to simplify the determination of the bond prices of
the economy by having S1 depending only on G1 and G2 (which are exogenous), and q1 depending
only on G1, G2, and S1. Otherwise q1 would depend also on G3 and S2 and S2 would in turn depend
on the repayment decisions of period t = 1 and the expected repayment decisions in periods t = 2,
and t = 3.
40In the three period model the pricing of the bonds should be computed using the investing fund’s
objective function which could be quite different from the investor’s utility function. However, the
goal here is to facilitate comparison with the infinite horizon model.
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Figure 4: Bond Price Function and Savings Function.
(i) Given the parameterization of the model, Figure 4 presents qi1 and S1 as func-
tions of δi1 and hX .
41 From Figure 4, it is possible to observe that qt is decreasing
in δt and hX , and St is increasing in those variables: larger δt implies a riskier
sovereign bond, and a larger hX implies more volatile portfolio earnings.
(ii) In the discussion of the wealth channel of contagion for the simpler model, q2
is given by the following FOC for each of the cases (A,B,C):
q
{A}
2
1
U + S1 + 3xh− S2qf
= β
{
(1− δ2)
3 1
U + S2 + 3xh
+ 3(1− δ2)
2δ2
1
U + S2 + 2xh
+ 3(1− δ2)δ2
2 1
U + S2 + xh
}
,
q
{B}
2
1
U + S1 + 2xh− S2qf
= β
{
(1− δ2)
2 1
U + S2 + 2xh
+ (1− δ2)
1
U + S2 + xh
}
,
q
{C}
2
1
U + S1 + xh− S2qf
= β
{
(1− δ2)
1
U + S2 + xh
}
.
41Results for the second period are analogous.
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